The 10% surcharge on most US imports expired on the morning of July 24. At 12:01 a.m. EDT on July 24, the 150 days the law allowed ran out — and it ended on its own, with no vote, no announcement, no negotiation. Congress could have extended it and did not; the one tariff bill moving would shrink the president's tariff powers, not add to them.
The drop is the part everyone sees. The part worth acting on is what is already forming to replace it. So the useful way to read it is not "imports got cheaper" — it is "a gap has opened, and something is being built to fill it." Plan around the gap, not the discount.
How the surcharge got here
The surcharge exists because of a Supreme Court ruling five months ago. In February the Court held that the emergency-powers law the administration had used for its tariffs never authorized tariffs at all (Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, decided 6–3), and every tariff built on that law fell at once. The White House replaced them the same day, reaching for a different law — Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 — and putting a flat 10% on most imports (Proclamation 11012, effective February 24). That is the law with the 150-day clock now running out.
One side note that carries real money: roughly $166 billion in duties collected under the struck-down tariffs — an industry estimate — is being refunded, but only if you file. CBP's refund system (called CAPE) is accepting claims now and targets payment 60 to 90 days after accepting one.
What's forming behind the gap — and whether it's you
Here is what most importers have not yet registered: two new tariffs are already moving to fill the space the surcharge leaves. Neither is final, but both point the same way, and one is close.
The near one is a forced-labor tariff. On June 2 the government proposed duties on 60 economies — 10% or 12.5% depending on the country, with China in the 12.5% group (USTR, June 2). Comments closed July 6; hearings began July 7. This is the clearer signal of the two, because a proposed rate already exists — and a proposed rate is the last step before a real one.
The one to watch if you import plastics or chemicals is a separate case, on industrial overcapacity. It covers 16 economies — China, the EU, Vietnam, India, Indonesia, Thailand, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Mexico among them — and its written scope names chemicals and plastics specifically (USTR, Federal Register, March 17). It sits one step behind the forced-labor case — hearings held, no rate proposed yet — but points the same direction. If you import those products from those countries, this is the duty most likely to catch you off guard this year, precisely because it is not in the headlines.
How likely are these to become real duties? Honestly, there is no clean number to quote — these cases are used too rarely for a reliable batting average, and they do not all end in tariffs. A few years ago the government proposed tariffs of this kind over foreign digital taxes, then suspended them to zero in a negotiation. But the forced-labor case is near-certain to produce something, because a rate is already on the table; and overcapacity has no single policy a country can repeal to make it disappear, which points toward duties rather than a negotiated exit. Read it as: less "whether," more "when, and how much."
On timing, the honest version: USTR aimed to be ready to act around now, as the surcharge lapsed — no rate has published on the overcapacity case yet, but one is described as imminent. So the planning horizon is weeks, not months — and on the overcapacity case, possibly days.
Why does this matter more than the sunset itself? Because a single importer sees only their own products. We watch every forming case across all 16 economies at once — so we can tell you the one taking shape in your category before it reaches your broker. That is the whole point of a standing watch.
What each origin pays after July 24
Here is the full duty picture per origin — the base rate plus every trade remedy stacked on top — before and after the 24th.
| Import category | Through Jul 23 | Jul 24 onward | Pending on top |
|---|---|---|---|
| China — most goods (301 Lists 1–3) | MFN + 25% + 10% | MFN + 25% | +12.5% forced-labor (proposed); overcapacity 301 TBD |
| China — consumer goods (List 4A) | MFN + 7.5% + 10% | MFN + 7.5% | same |
| China — strategic (EVs 100%, semis 50%) | strategic rate + 10% where not carved out | strategic rate | same |
| Vietnam, India, Thailand, EU, most others | MFN (avg ~3.4%) + 10% | MFN only | 10–12.5% forced-labor (proposed); overcapacity 301 for the 16 named |
| USMCA Canada/Mexico | exempt from the 10% | unchanged | forced-labor tier TBD; overcapacity (Mexico is on the 16-economy list) |
| Steel, aluminum, copper (any origin) | Section 232: 50% (the 10% didn't stack) | unchanged | — |
| Autos and parts (any origin) | Section 232: 25% (the 10% didn't stack) | unchanged | — |
| Patented pharmaceuticals | MFN (surcharge carve-out) | new Section 232: 100% from Jul 31 | — |
(MFN = most-favored-nation, the normal tariff schedule. Carve-out categories — pharma, some electronics, critical minerals, energy — never paid the 10%; check the surcharge's annex before assuming your product line did.)
Sources for the Stack. The 10% surcharge: Proclamation 11012 (Federal Register 2026-03824; CBP guidance CSMS #67844987). China's Section 301 rates (25% / 7.5% / up to 100%): USTR Section 301 tariff actions. Section 232 metals — 50% on steel/aluminum/copper, 25% on derivatives: proclamation "Further Adjusting the Tariff Regimes for Imports of Aluminum, Steel, and Copper," June 1 2026 (Federal Register 2026-11314). Section 232 autos and parts (25%): the Section 232 automobile action. Section 232 pharmaceuticals (100%): proclamation of April 6 2026 — effective July 31 for the 17 large firms named in its Annex III, September 29 for all other importers. MFN (~3.4% average): the Harmonized Tariff Schedule (USITC). Forced-labor 301 (proposed 10% / 12.5%): USTR, June 2 2026 (Federal Register, June 3). Overcapacity 301: USTR, Federal Register 2026-05214, March 17 2026.
Two readings of the same table. For a China-sourcing importer, July 24 takes off 10 points but leaves the entire China tariff structure standing — and the proposed forced-labor tariff would more than put the 10 back (12.5 against 10). For most other origins, imports genuinely return to the normal schedule — a duty layer big enough to change sourcing math, gone — for as long as the gap lasts. And for pharma, the move is the other way entirely.
What you can still do, and by when
First, the timing move that has now closed, because it explains what you may still be holding. The surcharge attached on the day goods cleared customs, not the day they shipped — so goods entered before that morning paid the 10%, and goods entered from that morning on do not, even if they left the factory in April. The window to deliberately hold a shipment for the cheaper rate is gone; what governs now is the entry date on goods already in motion. If any of yours are still sitting in a foreign-trade zone, note that the surcharge locked their rate in on the day they were admitted — so zone goods admitted during its run still carry the 10% even when entered now.
What is still live is the money. Two refund threads are open. If you paid the earlier, struck-down tariffs, the claim window is open now (CAPE). And keep your surcharge payment records, because a court appeal (State of Oregon v. Trump) will decide whether the 10% collected since February comes back — records are the difference between a refund and a write-off.
And one timing move is still open, in the other direction. If your goods are among those the forming tariffs would hit, the weeks before those new rates start are the time to bring shipments forward.
What the gap is worth, in dollars (illustrative — run it on your own numbers). An importer bringing in $400,000 of goods a month from Vietnam paid the surcharge — about $40,000 a month — from February until it lapsed on July 24. For every month the gap now stays open before a replacement tariff lands, that $40,000 stays in the business. At the container level, the surcharge was worth $10,000 on a $100,000 shipment — which is why, in its final days, deferring an entry a day or two past the 24th was close to free money for importers who could. That specific move has closed; the ongoing value is simply the monthly cost that has come off. (Assumptions stated so you can rerun the math; not a quote.)
Why this keeps happening
Step back and count the swings since February. A Supreme Court ruling killed one tariff system; the White House built a replacement the same day; a trade court struck that down too — though only for the states and importers that sued, so collection never actually stopped for everyone else; an appeals court then paused that ruling while it decides; and now a statutory clock ends the whole thing anyway. Five moves in five months, and not one of them came from a trade negotiation.
That is the lesson worth keeping after this issue is old: tariff levels used to move on policy announcements you could plan around a year ahead. Now they move on court calendars and legal deadlines. A company that reviews its exposure once a quarter learns about a 10-point swing after it has already paid it.
There is one precedent, and it is instructive. The only earlier time a president put a broad surcharge on imports was Nixon's 10% in August 1971 — also a balance-of-payments measure, also gone in about four months, imposed under emergency authority (Proclamation 4074). Three years later, Congress put an explicit balance-of-payments tariff power on the books and capped it: 15% at most, 150 days at most, no extension without an Act of Congress (Section 122, Trade Act of 1974). July 24 is that cap doing what a cap does.
Which is the whole idea behind this publication, in one line: the record is public and the clocks are published — what is scarce is someone watching them and telling you what is coming for you.
What would change this read
Two things are still unsettled. The appeals court could rule on State of Oregon v. Trump and scramble the refund math in either direction — deciding whether the five months of surcharge already collected come back. And the government could finalize one of the replacement tariffs faster than its own process suggests, closing the gap to weeks. Watch both.
The Docket — and what's next
Where the calendar stands: the surcharge lapsed on July 24. On July 31, the 100% tariff on patented drugs starts for the largest firms. And the overcapacity case is pending with no rate yet — a proposed action is expected within days.
We track every active US antidumping and countervailing duty order — 219 of them as of this issue, with the rates by exporter and the latest action on each — in the live case tracker. Briefs like this one land within 48 hours of the notices that matter.
Next issue: we go deep on that overcapacity investigation — who is actually in scope, how big the rate could be, and how to prepare before it is proposed, which could be any day now. If you import plastics or chemicals, that is the one to read.
Analysis of the public record, not legal advice — confirm anything operative with your licensed customs broker. Rates, dates, rulings, and case numbers are sourced to the Federal Register, CBP guidance, USTR notices, and court records; the $166 billion figure is an industry estimate.